A penniless lieutenant

"Philip’s credentials for marrying the world’s most eligible woman were tenuous. His father was a playboy who had disappeared into the champagne bars of the Cote d’Azur; his mother, abandoned, had gone mad and become a nun; his sisters had all married Nazis; he himself was only a naval lieutenant, and a penniless one at that. He had been a prince of Greece before a coup ousted his family, but the revolution had left him poor and nameless. He met Princess Elizabeth for the first time on 22 July 1939, when the royal family visited the Royal Naval College at Dartmouth under the proud supervision of Dickie Mountbatten. Philip was eighteen years old; Elizabeth was thirteen and playing with a clockwork train. Their eyes met over lemonade and ginger biscuits, and Philip was among the cadets invited to lunch on the royal yacht. There he impressed the princesses by being able to jump high and eat an abnormal quantity of shrimp, though not simultaneously. When the time came for the yacht to sail, the cadets followed in rowboats and motorboats for a while; Elizabeth watched the tall, blond, strikingly handsome Philip row his little boat farther than anyone else."

Indian Summer, Alex von Tunzelmann.

Una decisión histórica

-P: "Fue una paradoja que de todos los gobernantes de Europa Occidental no fueran Thatcher ni Mitterrand, sino un español, Felipe González, quien apoyara la unificación alemana tal como la planteó Kohl.

-Jordi Pujol: No, no fue una paradoja. Francia es una adversaria tradicional de Alemania, y procura que sea débil y muy condicionada. Y a Gran Bretaña tampoco le ha agradado nunca una Alemania con mucha fuerza en el Continente. Por otra parte, a mi entender es uno de los momentos de Felipe González en donde tuvo una actuación más brillante y además con efectos muy positivos para España. Con ello, Felipe González se puso a Kohl en el bolsillo. Luego González obtuvo gracias a Kohl aquellos fondos de cohesión europeos que han sido tan importantes para las inversiones públicas en España.

-P: Su posición respecto a la unificación alemana tampoco ofrece dudas.

J.P.: Creo que había que hacerlo a pesar de todos los inconvenientes, y se hizo bien. Se podría criticar tal vez a Kohl, por ejemplo por la equiparación que hizo entre el marco occidental y el oriental. Pero en una conversación que tuve con Pöhl, el entonces gobernador del Bundesbank, me dijo que técnicamente era un disparate y que así se lo había indicado al canciller hasta tres veces. Era más bien de tendencia socialista y fue el único que le planteó resistencia a la paridad entre los dos marcos, pero no porque fuera anti-Kohl. El canciller le comentó que no había más remedio que hacerlo y Pöhl llegó a una conclusión: esto no es una decisión técnica, ni tan siquiera una decisión política; es una decisión histórica. Y ante una decisión histórica, el gobernador del Bundesbank asumió que la responsabilidad era del Canciller y punto. El ya había dicho lo que tenía que decir."

Lluís Bassets, El País online. Una conversación con Jordi Pujol.

A cotton pad over their heart

-The Beijing News: Do you talk with prisoners before the lethal injection?

-Wang Jun: Not the first time, because everyone was too nervous. But I did on November 4 [,1997], when I gave a lethal injection to Zhang Rongcai. Beforehand, I asked him if he was afraid, and he said he was not. So I asked him to assist me, as I very much wanted to know people’s sensations before they died. I remember that when I had injected about one-third of the drug, he said that he felt as if he were floating. I asked again later, and he said the sensation was quite comfortable. I then asked again and he didn’t answer, and I felt that he died very peacefully. So the majority of condemned prisoners all request and hope they can receive lethal injection.

-The Beijing News: Speaking from your personal experience, what types of psychological changes does lethal injection induce in prisoners?

-Wang Jun: I don’t particularly like to recall what takes place at the execution site. I have known a lot of condemned prisoners, especially female prisoners, who know they will soon be executed. They all sew a small cotton pad over their heart, because they don’t want their deaths to be too gruesome, with blood flowing all over. Now they don’t need to stitch on [such a pad].

Li Jingrui, The Beijing News, I administered China's first lethal injection.

La sua voce avuto un colore

"-Ma quan fu, come fu che divenne Mahalia Jackson?!?
Oh! Molti, molti anni dopo: da vecchia. La storia di Mahalia Jackson, cara mia, non è la storia di una cantante: è la storia di una sguattera, poi di una stiratrice, poi di una parruchiera, poi di una fioraia: avevo ormai 40 anni quando vendetti la mia voce e ci vollero tre viaggi in Europa perhé i bianchi d'America mi conoscessero oltre la Decima strada! I neri, loro sì, mi conoscevano un poco: quelli che venivano in chiesa. Ma i bianchi, ecco, il modo per arrivare ai bianchi era la radio, a quel tempo la televisione non c'era, e la radio era segregata: un nero non poteva cantare alla radio, quasi la sua voce avesse un colore. Si vendevano dischi ma clandestini, li compravano i neri e basta, fu per via di simposio di quei professori che divenni cantante e andai alla Carnegie Hall. Io non volevo andare alla Carnegie Hall, mi sembrava peccato ed ero cosi spaventata. C'eran tutti quei signori, quei bianchi, eran venuti da Filadelfia, da Boston, e poi il posto era il posto dove aveva cantato Enrico Caruso: mi pareva d'aver perso la voce, di non avere più gola. Però insieme ai bianchi c'erano i neri e all'improvviso capii che quei neri erano feri di me, e allora cominciai a cantare con ogni parte di me, con le mani, coi piedi, con gli occhi, col mio grosso corpo, e all'improvviso anche i bianchi cominiciarono a piangere, a tender le braccia, e io non so come fu, io mi trovai a cantare in ginocchio e io credo che quella sia stata l'unica volta che qualcuno ha cantato in ginocchio alla Carnegie Hall, come in chiesa. Infatti mi alzai e credevo che mi prendessero in giro e invee anche i bianchi scrissero bene di me sui loro bianchi giornali e la radio mi chiamò come se fossi bianca è la tv, che è bianca, mi disse vieni, il primo ad accettarmi fu Ed Sullivan con il suo show, e cominciò questa vita che doveva rompermi il cuore, tagliarmi come un albero tagliato, oh! Se sapessi dire di no!

Oriana Fallaci intervista Mahalia Jackson (1964), l'Europeo.

Il cotello nello stomaco della moglie

Non li piace la violenza? Lei che infilò un coltello nello stomaco della sua moglie e non si perde un incontro de boxe?

Il coltello nello stomaco della moglie fu un delitto. Un delitto grave, e la violenza non c'entra. Qanto alla boxe, be', la boxe non è una violenza. È una conversazione, il dialogo fra due uomini che parlano con le mani, anziché con la voce: colpendo all'orecchio, al naso, alla bocca, allo stomaco, anziché all'intelligencia. La boxe è un'arte nobile. Quando un uomo è sul quadrato e combatte, non esprime brutalità. Esprime una natura complessa e sottile, come la natura di un vero intellettuale, o di un consumato aristrocratico. Un pugile è un uomo meno brutale e magari nient'affatto brutale, quando ha finito il combattimento, perché coi pugni ha transformato la violenza in qualcosa di bello, di nobile, disciplinato. Fino al trionfo dello spirito. No, io non sono violento. Esserlo significa attaccare litigio, e io non ricordo di avere mai incominciato un litigio. Né ricordo di aver mai picchiato una donna. Una estranea, voglio dire. Posso aver picchiato la moglie, ma questo è diverso. Quanso sei sposato, i casi son due: o picci la moglie o non la picci. Alcuni vanno avanti tutta la vita sensa picchiarla, altri la picchiano una volta sola magari e passano per violenti. A me piace esser sposato con donne che di tanto in tanto picchio, e di conseguenza picchiano me."

Oriana Fallaci intervista Norman Mailer (1967), L'Europeo.

Battle for the Pearl River Delta

"...There have always been differences between Beijing and Guangdong in their approaches to economic development. Beijing prefers a centralized and bureaucratic management, while Guangdong, which has bustling and thriving Hong Kong as a neighbor and as a role model, is inclined towards a more liberal society, with the economy led by private businesses rather than by state-owned enterprises (SOEs).

The latest clash is over strategies for the economic and social integration of the rich Pearl River Delta (PRD). One of the government's aims is to make the delta more dynamic. It includes over 40,000 square kilometers and is home to the two Special Administrative Regions of Macau and Hong Kong, and nine cities in Guangdong province, including the capital Guangzhou. The area accounts for approximately one quarter of China's total trade value.

Thirty years ago, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) chose the delta for the start of the reform and opening-up process. Guangdong had advantages for this. First, it was easier for Guangdong to adapt to a market economy, given its proximity to what were then the capitalist colonies of Hong Kong (Britain) and Macau (Portugal).
[...]

The concern in Beijing is that the municipalities in the PRD are too politically self-centered and defiant of higher authorities. Beijing believes it can better control this "insurrection" through a gradual integration of the main PRD cities into a "mega metropolitan area", with its development under central government control.

Early this year, the State Council, China's cabinet, unveiled a development plan for the PRD toward 2020, focusing on upgrading local industrial production and economic integration. However, while paying lip service, Guangdong provincial officials and most local party cadres in practice are trying to skirt around Beijing's guidance. They prefer a softer intervention in the economy and in society that allows greater freedom in decision-making processes, both with regard to the economy and social issues. This is despite the fact that such an approach has in the past resulted in "vicious competition" between PRD cities.

Of the more than 100 million residents in Guangdong, more than 60 million are Cantonese speakers who rarely watch China Central Television (CCTV) channels, which are broadcast mainly in Putonghua, says Li Zhigang, an associate professor at the Department of Urban Regional Planning of the Sun Yat-sen University in Guangzhou. Most people in Guangdong watch Hong Kong television, he says.

Like many other faculty members at universities in Guangdong, Li is not a Guangdonger and he does not speak Cantonese; he is from northern Hubei province and he moved to Guangzhou after receiving his PhD from the University of Southampton in the United Kingdom. Li tries to be neutral when analyzing the different approaches of Beijing and Guangdong toward the PRD's development. He says the central government is worried because city governments in Guangdong simply get round or defy Beijing's policies as much as they can. "The central government wants to see a coordinated development of PRD cities under its guidance, as happened in the Yangtze River Delta, where Shanghai is the undisputed leader. [But] in Guangdong, you have too many big cities which are reluctant to accept Guangzhou or any other city as the leader of the PRD region," says Li.

The Guangzhou-based Nanfang Daily in February published a story on how the Guangdong party chief, Wang Yang, a non-Guangdonger, had stirred up a fierce debate. He asked PRD city mayors to acknowledge Guangzhou as their "big brother". Wang stressed that local officials should team up "with a mentality of [respecting] the big brother ... While competition of cities at an appropriate level is encouraged, greater support must be given to their cooperation ... so that they can make a greater contribution to the modernization of the nation."

Joseph Cheng of the City University of Hong Kong and an expert on Chinese politics says that Wang Yang, who was formerly party chief of Chongqing municipality, "is having serious problems in gaining support from local [Guangdong] officials. He has almost lost control. Conflicts between the Guangdong party chief and local cadres are now commonplace, but Beijing will not allow a Guangdonger to be party secretary because it may reinforce regional power."

Until about six years ago, the central and Guangdong governments had the common aim of delegating greater administrative autonomy to the cities. Free competition among PRD cities had greatly revitalized and boosted their economic development. But this changed when Hu Jintao became president in 2003 and prioritized the need for more balanced and coordinated economic development. The CCP wants to accomplish its motto of an "harmonious society" by reducing competition between regions. This competition is also seen as wasting economic resources. Hence, all localities have been asked to first satisfy national interests before realizing regional ambitions. This clearly impacts Guangdong and its multiple power centers, as stated in the State Council's development plan for the PRD.

The plan envisions that 10 years from now, the PRD will be assembled into three main urban nodes, developed through mergers. Shenzhen and Dongguan will be a center on the east bank of the Pearl River; the Zhuhai Economic Special Zone will serve as the center for the urban areas on the west bank of the Pearl River; and finally, Guangzhou and Foshan will be merged into a larger city. Beyond that, further cooperation should lead to deeper regional integration, as the government's plan assesses, "Under the unified leadership and coordination of the provincial government, the cities will establish multi-stratum cooperation mechanisms ... Following the example of Guangzhou-Foshan integration and starting with the integration of transportation infrastructures, a situation of unified development [will be reached] where urban planning is integrated, infrastructure is commonly built and used, industries are developed through win-win cooperation, and public affairs are coordinately administered."

The Bauhinia Foundation, a policy think-tank for the Hong Kong government, published a study this year defending a merger of Hong Kong with a projected "world-class Pearl River Delta metropolis". In 2007, the foundation published a report recommending a merger between Hong Kong and Shenzhen, once the former British colony is fully part of China, in 2047.

The Shenzhen municipality said in a working paper in 2006 that the city "will position itself as part of an international metropolis with Hong Kong". Shenzhen is considered the most pro-Beijing city in Guangdong. It emerged 30 years ago and its success is a result of the blessing given to it by Deng Xiaoping. Moreover, its population is almost entirely made up of migrants from other provinces who have few links with Cantonese society.

According to Bauhinia, the PRD metropolis should comprise the nine cities mentioned in the central government's plan - Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Jiangmen, Zhuhai, Foshan, Huizhou and Zhaoqing - plus Hong Kong and Macau. Bauhinia estimates that this mega-metropolitan region would by 2038 be the world's biggest in terms of gross domestic product.

The Cantonese establishment, however, is against this merging process, and Bauhinia warns that "there are some problems in the Guangdong-Hong Kong integration process that need to be resolved". Bauhinia considers the risks of "competition and conflicts of interest among cities in the region" and emphasizes that if the PRD is to be a "unified territory", it will need to follow the State Council's plan.

Bauhinia has this to say of the Cantonese identity: "These ethnic and geographical ties are sure to grow even closer. The close relationships are reflected not only in economics, but in all facets of the economy, community, culture and livelihood. The close interactions between the people of Guangdong and Hong Kong are an undercurrent in the development of the relationship between the two territories. Indeed, this thread is becoming increasingly important."

Supporters of the idea for the PRD's unification point to Tokyo and London as examples. Professor Li, though, is skeptical of a complete merger happening. "There are too many political differences among the metropolitan entities." At the 2005 annual session of the National People's Congress (NPC), pro-Beijing Shenzhen representatives proposed to introduce on the agenda a discussion on a hypothetical future merger with Hong Kong, but Guangdong deputies blocked it. Since then, this topic has been avoided by the NPC, the highest state body and the only legislative house in the mainland, said a source in Hong Kong who wished to remain anonymous.

Christine Loh, chief executive officer of Civic Exchange, a public policy think-tank in Hong Kong, reported in 2007 that the Guangdong government "applied for the designation of a Guangzhou Development Zone" to compete with Shanghai and Tianjin, the port city south of Beijing. "Guangdong is highly political: it pursues every chance to assert itself."

The bottom line is that Guangdong has a more business-minded society than the rest of the country and is reluctant to accept intrusion by the mandarins, especially those from distant Beijing. In earlier times, Guangdong served as a base for strong federalist movements, but these were ultimately crushed by the military intervention of Sun Yat-sen, the foremost pioneer of republican China, in 1923.

The State Council's plan for the PRD does acknowledge the democratic role Guangdong has played for the country, "The Pearl River Delta, especially the special economic zones in the region, will continue to serve as an experimental field and demonstration area, deepen reform of the economic system and social administration system, advance the development of democracy and the rule of law." At the NPC's meeting in 2008, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao asked "people in Guangdong to further free their minds and continue to take the lead in the modernization process".

Despite this, there is a scarcity of Cantonese staff at Guangdong's universities and academic institutes. Twenty years ago, the majority of teachers at Jinan University were Cantonese. "Nowadays, they are the minority," says Shao Yi, a professor at the Institute for Chinese Dialects at Jinan University, in Guangzhou. Although the institute is focused on the study of native languages in Guangdong, about 90% of its researchers come from other provinces. Only Mandarin is used throughout the whole educational structure in Guangdong because the law requests it, says Shao.

Cheng, of the City University of Hong Kong, believes Cantonese is not promoted because the central government sees it "as a transmission channel for democratic ideas from Hong Kong". The issue of Cantonese identity is sensitive. Six experts on Cantonese culture involved in the preservation of local languages and social traditions declined to be interviewed for this article.

Wu Wei, director of the Institute of Chinese Dialects, is confident that Cantonese will not disappear because it is used by the media and is a strong language that has been replacing local minority languages faster than Mandarin. But Li Zhigang says society in Guangdong "is being split into two worlds with no connections". That is, the local community and the booming migrant group. "Hong Kong is what makes Guangdong special, more than their cultural identity. It helped the province to develop faster and more democratically," says Li.

People in favor of Cantonese singularity see the merging of PRD cities as a threat, especially a merger of Hong Kong with an expanding Shenzhen, or even worse, with a PRD mega city. In that scenario, Hong Kong would become a minor partner and lose its influence as an agent for modernization.


Cristian Segura and Wu Zhong, Asia Times Online. Tug-of-war over Pearl River Delta.

Obama al parany xinès

Quan els líders polítics d’Occident visiten la Xina, és costum que reservin un espai a la seva agenda per impartir una conferència davant la comunitat acadèmica. Són contactes que s’organitzen sense polèmica, just el contrari del succeït ahir amb la trobada que el president dels Estats Units, Barack Obama, va mantenir a Xangai amb 500 universitaris. La Casa Blanca buscava un cop d’efecte per convèncer als xinesos de les bondats de la democràcia. La diferència d’interessos entre els dos governs va afegir encara més interès a un esdeveniment que al final va passar sense pena ni glòria.

El Partit Comunista Xinès (PCX) va acceptar que l’administració nord-americana presentés el diàleg entre Obama i els estudiants com la clàssica discussió oberta als ajuntaments americans on els ciutadans interpel•len els seus polítics. “El president Obama portarà aquesta tradició política arrelada a la democràcia americana per primera vegada a la Xina”, va informar la Casa Blanca. Pequín es va negar en canvi a acceptar la petició del govern dels EUA de retransmetre-ho per televisió a tot el país –com sí s’havia produït amb els dos anteriors presidents nord-americans-. El PCX va concedir que l’acte es retransmetés en directe a Xangai i per Internet.
El president dels EUA va ser pedagògic, com si es dirigís a escolars, en descriure les virtuts de la democràcia. Va subratllar que els drets humans “són drets universals” i va remuntar-se a Abraham Lincoln per recordar que als EUA han estat llargues la lluita contra el racisme o per la igualtat de gènere.

Sis de les vuit preguntes eren tan respectuoses amb el PCX i d’una candidesa tal, que Obama va tenir poc marge per lluir-se. Se li va demanar com valora el fet que Chicago i Xangai siguin ciutat agermanades, què opina de la concessió del premi Nobel de la Pau o quines són les seves receptes per a l’èxit. L’organització també va llegir una pregunta que va descol•locar Obama, suposadament escrita per un empresari de Taiwan que deia que el seu negoci perillava si els EUA continuen venent armes a l’illa rebel. Obama va respondre que el seu govern recolza la unificació i que l’economia ajuda a enfortir lligams.

L’única pregunta crítica amb el PCX va ser la realitzada des de l’ambaixada dels EUA a Pequín. L’ambaixador li va demanar la seva opinió sobre la censura a Internet que existeix a la Xina. Obama va dir ser “un gran partidari de la no-censura. Com més lliure circula la informació, més s’enforteix una societat... I com més em critiquen, millor líder sóc perquè em forcen a escoltar opinions que no comparteixo.” La resposta semblava pensada per a alumnes de primària i observadors presents com els dos corresponsals del Wall Street Journal dubtaven de l’eficàcia del seu missatge.

El mateix Obama va destacar que a la Xina hi ha 300 milions d’internautes i més de 60 milions de blogs registrats. Molts usuaris són prou hàbils per saltar-se la censura i milers de blogs critiquen els polítics de la seva regió. Els intensos debats aquests dies sobre la visita d’Obama als principals portals d’internet xinesos demostraven que la classe mitjana, a favor o en contra, entén què és la democràcia occidental. El mateix fet que el PCX volgués restar rellevància a la conferència, ho demostra.
[...]

Cristian Segura, Diari Avui d'avui.

A suitcase as a dinner table

"Though born in Henan Province, he built his career in Guangdong, where he became Party chief in 1965 at the remarkably tender age of 46. Like countless other officials, he was purged during the Cultural Revolution; he was assigned the relatively menial task of being a fitter at the Xiangzhong Mechanics Factory in Hunan Province. Zhao Wujun, the youngest of his four sons (there is also one daughter), worked with him. The family lived in a small apartment nearby with a suitcase in the middle of the living room that served as the dinner table.

Zhao’s return from exile shows the high regard Beijing’s leaders had for him. As Zhao once described it to friends, in April 1971 the Zhao family was suddenly roused in the middle of the night by a banging at the door. Without explanation, the factory’s Party chief informed Zhao that he was to go at once to Changsha, the provincial capital. The factory’s only means of transport was a three- wheeled motorcycle, which was quickly readied to take him.

Zhao was driven to Changsha’s airport, where a plane had been prepared to fly him to Beijing. Still unaware of what was happening, he boarded the plane; it landed in Beijing, and he was driven to the well-appointed Beijing Hotel. Zhao said he didn’t sleep all night; after his years in the political wilderness, the mattress was too soft.
In the morning, he was taken for a meeting with Premier Zhou Enlai at the Great Hall of the People. When they met, Zhao began a speech he had been preparing all night: “I have been rethinking the Cultural Revolution during these years as a labourer – ” Zhou cut him off and told him, “You’ve been called to Beijing because the Central Committee has decided to name you as a deputy Party chief of Inner Mongolia.”

Zhao later learned that Chairman Mao himself had been responsible for his return from political exile. Mao one day had suddenly asked an attendant whatever happened to Zhao Ziyang? When he was told that Zhao had been purged and sent to the countryside as a labourer, Mao expressed his displeasure with the excesses of the purification effort he had launched with the Cultural Revolution: “Purging every single person? That’s not what I want … ” With that, Zhao Ziyang was rehabilitated."

Adi Ignatius, Prisoner of the State. The secret journal of Zhao Ziyang.

Urgència per fer amics a la Xina

"La creixent influència mundial de la Xina i la dependència mútua en qüestions econòmiques estan igualant la posició de força entre Pequín i Washington. La visita de Barack Obama a partir d’avui i fins dimecres a Xangai i a Pequín és un viatge que la Casa Blanca ha dissenyat perquè sigui més afable en comparació amb els realitzats pels anteriors presidents dels Estats Units.
L’Administració Obama fa la cort a la Xina. Tracta al gegant asiàtic d’igual a igual i des de els EUA es promou l’idea que entre tots dos formen el G2, l’eix sobre el qual roda el món. Washington evita els assumptes que puguin irritar al Partit Comunista Xinès (PCX), sobretot perquè la seva cooperació és fonamental per superar la crisi econòmica. En el primer viatge oficial a Pequín d’un representant d’Obama, el de la secretària d’Estat nord-americana, Hillary Clinton, el febrer passat, es va prioritzar el diàleg econòmic i els afers mediambientals però es van obviar les qüestions de drets humans i la manca de cooperació que els EUA lamenten que la Xina manté en conflictes internacionals de primer ordre. Obama va dir ahir en una conferència a Tokio que el debat amb la Xina sobre els drets humans "no es pot tirar endavant amb rancor sinó amb esperit d'equip."
Malgrat aquesta posició menys crítica, la Casa Blanca ha provocat els ànims xinesos en insistir que Obama s’entrevistarà aviat amb el Dalai Lama i que demanarà al president xinès, Hu Jintao, que es reuneixi amb el líder budista pel bé de la pau al Tibet.
La crisi econòmica és el nus que lliga a les dues potències per damunt de qualsevol altre assumpte. Si el consum nord-americà no es revifa, el creixement xinès es veu perjudicat. La Casa Blanca pressiona al PCX perquè augmenti encara més el tipus de canvi de la seva moneda, el que provocaria un encariment de les exportacions xineses i afavoriria la competitivitat dels productes fets als EUA. El govern xinès assegura que la seva competitivitat en preus és resultat de l’evolució industrial arran de la globalització. El portaveu del ministeri d’Exteriors Xinès, Qin Giang, va insistir dimecres passat que la clau per ressuscitar l’economia nord-americana és “que tinguin més cura en corregir el deute públic.” La declaració és especialment significativa perquè l’Estat xinès ha finançat la bonança econòmica dels EUA de l’última dècada en convertir-se el comprador número ú del món de reserves de dòlars i dels bons de deute públic nord-americans.
El Director d’Afers Asiàtics del Consell de Seguretat Nacional dels EUA, Jeffrey Bader, va admetre aquesta setmana que “hi ha una percepció comú a la regió [del Pacífic] que la influència dels EUA ha anat a la baixa mentre que la xinesa està augmentant”. Bader va concloure que “sense la cooperació Xinesa, cap d’aquests afers [globals] es pot conduir amb èxit.” A part de l’economia, els punts calents de l’agenda entre Obama i Hu seran la lluita contra el canvi climàtic i la necessitat americana de què la Xina pressioni més a l’Iran i Corea del Nord perquè aturin les seves ambicions en armament nuclear. El govern xinès va apuntar la possibilitat es firmi algun tipus de declaració conjunta. Bader va descartar que es pugui pactar cap posició en comú de cara a la propera cimera del canvi climàtic a Copenhaguen.
Li Cheng, membre del centre d’estudis polítics Brookings Institution creu que “respecte els seus predecessors, Obama ja ha demostrat una posició més respectuosa respecte la Xina”. Li valora la visita del president dels EUA serà menys tensa pel que fa al debat pels drets humans perquè els actuals líders xinesos són “més oberts de ment” i “partidaris de reformes democràtiques”.

Cop d’efecte com a El Cairo?
Analistes i periodistes nord-americans han pressionat a la Casa Blanca per conèixer si Obama té intenció d’aprofitar la seva estada a la Xina per protagonitzar alguna intervenció pública conciliadora. El model a seguir seria la conferència que va donar el president nord-americà el juny passat a la Universitat de El Cairo. Obama va fer en aquella ocasió una emotiva crida en favor de l’enteniment entre els EUA i el món àrab. L’ocasió per donar un cop d’efecte a la Xina serà demà dilluns en una trobada amb estudiants universitaris de Xangai. Obama també celebrarà dimarts una roda de premsa junt amb Hu Jintao, un fet excepcional si es té en compte que pot passar més d’un any sense que el president xinès respongui davant els mitjans."

Cristian Segura, a l'AVUI d'avui, versió reduïda: El gir xinès d'Obama.

When Obama came to China

"After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States and its allies expected successive waves of democratization to extend democratic capitalism to the farthest reaches of the globe. Instead, China's model of state capitalism appears to have weathered a series of financial storms better than democratic capitalism, and the United States now struggles with the question of how to engage this hybrid authoritarian-capitalist state in the post-Cold War world.
The good news is that Chinese society is gradually becoming more pluralistic, and its leadership more open-minded, on the once-intractable issues of democracy, human rights, and even religious freedom. The country's top two leaders, President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao, have voiced strong support for the incremental implementation of democratic reforms, conceiving of democracy in roughly the same way that the West does."

[...]

The existence of these new currents in Chinese society provide an opening for Obama to engage Beijing on political issues in a way that can be at once consistent with American values and respectful of China's enduring cultural identity and ongoing efforts at reform. Instead of allowing "democracy" to be the elephant in the room, he should take a page from his speech at Cairo University this summer and broach the subject with respect for China's recent achievements, a dose of humility concerning the democratic project generally, and a sophisticated and sympathetic understanding of China's turbulent 20th-century political history.

Cheng Li, The Brookings Institution. Can President Obama pull a Cairo-Speech Moment in China?